How Current Reform Proposals Would Impact Colorado Premiums
From the beginning of the health care reform debate, cost has been the primary issue. Plenty of focus has been aimed at how to control health care costs (which nobody seems to have figured out yet), along with CBO estimates of what each piece of proposed legislation would cost taxpayers. But we haven’t seen much in the way of determining how the proposed legislation would impact health insurance premiums. We know that in states where health insurance is guaranteed issue but coverage is not mandatory, premiums on individual policies are far higher than in states like Colorado, where policies are underwritten. But what would happen to premiums in states that use medical underwriting (all but five states) if the current versions of health care reform become law?
Wellpoint actuaries – the people who are responsible for setting premiums – have crunched the numbers and come up with their best estimates as to how premiums would be impacted in the 14 states where Wellpoint operates. Colorado is one of those states, and for the first time we’re able to see a detailed analysis of what would likely happen to premiums for people here, both the old and the young, the sick and the healthy. All health insurance providers operating in Colorado have to follow the same rules as far as state mandates and regulations, and they all have to compete with each other. So it’s reasonable to assume that the data is also indicative of what would happen to premiums on policies offered by most of the health insurance carriers in Colorado.
With the current proposed legislation, it looks like we would see a huge premium increase for young, healthy people in the individual market in Colorado (about 140%). For average age policyholders in average health, premiums would likely increase by 52%. Older, sicker individuals would get a break though, and would see a premium decrease of about 22%.
The bulk of the increase in premiums stems from the fact that the requirement that everyone carry health insurance has been greatly eroded over the last several weeks. If the penalty for not having health insurance is dramatically less than the cost of coverage, it makes sense that healthy people who are trying to save money might opt for the penalty instead of the premiums. And if health insurance is guaranteed issue anyway, why wouldn’t they? If they started to feel sick, they could sign up for health insurance at that point, knowing that their pre-existing conditions would be covered. The obvious result would be ever-increasing loss ratios for health insurance companies, followed by even higher premiums to try to make up the difference. Higher premiums would mean more healthy people – who otherwise would still like to have health insurance coverage – being forced to drop their policies. There is no possible way that guaranteed issue health insurance is sustainable unless everyone is required to be in the health insurance system.
The penalty for opting to not carry health insurance is currently proposed to start at $200/year in 2014, and would gradually increase to $750/year in 2017. This is not even close to what health insurance actually costs, which means that people who are healthy might very well choose to pay the penalty rather than buy health insurance. Another problem with the proposed method for enforcing the mandate is that is would work via the tax system. That leaves millions of Americans – those who don’t file taxes, or who have no tax liability – outside of the mandate-enforcement system. If we truly want to make sure that all Americans are insured, we need to have a better way of enforcing the mandate. We need penalties that are approximately equal to the cost of premiums, an enforcement system that is more broad than the IRS (perhaps a combination of schools, the DMV, hospitals and clinics, and any government office), and increased subsidies for lower income families.
Health insurance for everyone, regardless of pre-existing conditions, is possible. But it’s not possible if the system is essentially set up to encourage only unhealthy people to buy health insurance. Insurance works by spreading risk. We need to make sure that young, healthy people are paying into the insurance pool in order to offset the claims made by older, sicker individuals. Without a strong, widely enforced mandate, guaranteed issue health insurance isn’t a sustainable proposal.












The problem with this mandate is that it will force the young and healthy to pay a wildly disproportionate share of the costs relative to what they use. The purpose of the mandate is to subsidize the old and sick. Rates for the young will skyrocket if the ratios between what the young and old pay are restricted. Males are even worse off, if gender neutral policies are forced. In addition, the mandate will be for overly bloated coverage that young people really don’t need or want. I know I will opt out if the fine is low. I make too much for subsidies but too little to afford monthly premiums. I am trying to pay off $70,000 in student loans. If the fine is too high and I’m forced to buy in, I’ll make it my goal to use as many healthcare resources as possible because I refuse to throw away large sums of money every month and get very little in return.
Adam,
It is in large part because the mandate language in the current reform bill is so weak that we could see such high premiums for young, healthy people. The more people who opt out and choose to pay the fine, the higher premiums will be for people who choose to be insured. Covering pre-existing conditions (which is an aspect of reform that Americans overwhelmingly favor) comes with a price. In order to offset the higher expenses, more people have to join the insurance pool. But if the fine for opting out is low, people will choose to pay the fine. And this perpetuates the problem.
In the Wellpoint study, a full 50% of the premium increase for a young, healthy male, was attributed to the weak mandate language in the reform bill, in anticipation of people opting to pay the fine instead of buying insurance. If the fine were more in line with the premiums, the actual price of a policy would be significantly lower.
You are correct about the fact that premiums from young, healthy policyholders help to subsidize the cost of care for older, and sicker people. But it would do us all well to keep in mind that one day (hopefully) we’ll be old too.